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NOTES
THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO THE
IMMUNIZATION OF DEFENSE WITNESSES
Throughout the prosecution of criminal defendants, the prosecutor bene-
fits from a number of tools at his disposal. One such tool is the power to obtain
testimony from key witnesses that otherwise would be protected by their fifth
amendment privilege against self incrimination.' This prosecutorial power is
rooted in statutes which authorize a prosecutor to compel testimony from
recalcitrant witnesses by a grant of immunity from prosecution.' These im-
munity statutes have existed almost as long as the fifth amendment itself.' The
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the validity of these statutory immunity
grants as a method of providing the government access to valuable inculpatory
testimony by constitutionally supplanting the witness' privilege against self in-
crimination.' This governmental prerogative is currently authorized by the
Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act of 1970. 5
Criminal defendants, however, have not been accorded a corresponding
privilege. 6
 As a result, they are absolutely powerless to compel exculpatory
' U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person .
	 shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . 	 ."
2
 For a general discussion of the history of these immunity statutes, see Note, Immunity
Statutes and the Constitution, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1968); Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts
in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
' See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 n.13 (1972). The purpose of such
statutes is to reconcile society's need for certain testimony with the interests of the witness against
compulsory self incrimination protected by the fifth amendment privilege. The basic rationale
behind these statutes is that by granting immunity against criminal prosecution based on his
testimony, a witness can be compelled to testify without violating his privilege against self in-
crimination. See Note, Witness Immunity Statutes: The Constitutional and Functional Sufficiency of "Use
Immunity", 51 B.U. L. REV, 616, 621 (1971).
An underlying policy of these statutes is that an immunity grant serves as a useful
governmental tool to mitigate the adverse impact of the privilege against self imcrimination on
the effective enforcement of certain criminal laws. For example, the early colonial statutes re-
flected the fact that, in certain classes of crimes suchas conspiracy and political bribery, only the
persons implicated in the crime were capable of giving useful testimony. See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). These ideas continue to provide the foundation for the present
federal immunity statute. 18 U.S.C. SS 6001-6005 (1976). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 1188, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970).
See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1893).
' 18 U.S.C. SS 6001-6005(1976) (passed as part of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926) [hereinafter cited as immunity Act of 1970 or Act of
1970]. See note 67 infra for the text of the Act pertinent to this Note.
6
 Under the Immunity Act of 1970, only a United States Attorney is authorized to in-
itiate an immunity grant. See note 67 infra. The role of a court under this statute is to issue an
order granting immunity upon the request of the United States Attorney. See SENATE COMM ON
THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 145 (1969) ("The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the facts on which the
order is predicated."). Although .a federal prosecutor is free to grant immunity to a defense
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testimony from witnesses who invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination. This situation raises the question under what circumstances, if
any, should defendants also be provided with the immunized testimony of wit-
nesses in their behalf.' In the past, almost all of the courts facing this issue have
rejected, rather summarily, defendants' requests that their witnesses be com-
pelled to testify by a grant of immunity.° The primary reason given by those
courts to justify denying these requests was that a court is powerless to compel
the government to exercise its discretion under an immunity statute to im-
munize defense witnesses. 9 Although this is currently the majority view with
regard to the issue of defense witness immunity, recently, a minority of courts
have indicated that, in certain situations, due process may require that defend-
ants be provided with the immunized testimony of their witnesses.'°
witness if the relevant statutory conditions are met, see 18 U.S.C. S 6003(b)(1) and (2) (1976) at
note 67 infra, it is highly unlikely that a prosecutor will ever feel obligated to immunize a defense
witness.. Cf Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, C.J.) ("Ob-
viously the Government would be unlikely to call a witness unless his testimony was thought to be
in support of the Government's case."). This Note; therefore, focuses on the responsibility of the
courts to provide a due process safeguard to redress the disparate treatment accorded defendants
under that Act.
For previous discussions of this issue, see, e.g., Note, The Sixth Admendmeni Right to
Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1266 (1978) (hereinafter cited as
Harvard Note]; Note, "The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitu-
tional Right to Witness Immunity,•30 STAN. L. REV. 1211 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Every Man's
Evidence]; Note, A Re-examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use for Kastigar, 10 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 74 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Re-examination]; Note, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the
Compelled Testimony of Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 953 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Columbia
Note].
° See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir.
1978); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339
n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79, (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith,
542 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 249 (2d Cir. 1975), ap-
peal dismissed sub urn. Hoff v. United States, 425 U.S. 902 (1976); Thompson v. Garrison, 516
F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975); United States v. Bautista, 509 F.2d
675, 677 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); Cerda v. United States, 488 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir.
1973); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d
171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1968); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d
531, 534 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied en bane, 364 F.2d 666 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir.
1974), cm. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975); Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 933 (1975); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
10 See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203-04 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
913 (1979); United States v. Gaither, 539 F.2d 753, 754 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring
in denial of rehearing en banc), CM. denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. De Palma, 476
F. Supp. 775, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal pending sub nom. United States v. Horwitz, No.
79-1315 (2d Cir.); United States v. La Duca, 447 F. Supp. 779, 787 (D.N.J.), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978).
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The purpose of this Note is to suggest that the courts have both the author-
ity and the responsibility to provide a defendant with the immunized testimony
of witnesses in his behalf where this is necessary to protect his due process right
to a fair trial. To accomplish this, the Note will first analyze the due process
considerations involved in a defendant's request for defense witness immunity.
Concluding that a defendant's due process right to a fair trial is broad enough
to encompass the provision of such immunity, the Note will then examine the
current approaches taken by the federal courts to effectuate this right when
faced with a request for defense witness immunity. Finally, the Note will pro-
pose a practicable resolution of the due process problems created by a defend-
ant's inability to compel testimony in his behalf and suggest under what cir-
cumstances the courts should provide him with defense witness immunity.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY:
DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
Since a defendant is powerless to compel testimony in his behalf from
witnesses who invoke their fifth amendment privilege against self incrimina-
tion," he may be deprived of the use of valuable exculpatory evidence at his
trial absent some other way of introducing the testimony." Without the use of
such testimony, a defendant may be denied his right to a fair trial in violation
of due process.' 3 Acccordingly, this inability to secure otherwise unavailable
testimony from defense witnesses by a grant of immunity implicates due pro-
cess considerations inherent in the right to a fair trial
A. Defense Witness Immunity and the Right to a Fair Trial
A fundamental predicate of our criminal jurisprudence is the constitu-
tional mandate that no defendant shall be tried and convicted of any crime
without due process of law." This guarantee of due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair trial. 15 To be considered fair, however, a trial need not be free of
all errors, but it must be free of actual bias and even the appearance of un-
fairness." Basic to this concept of a fair trial are the right to the effective
assistance of counsel," the right to confront and cross examine witnesses," and
the right to call witnesses in one's behalf."' These rights combine with others
See text and accompanying note at note 6 supra.
" See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 967 (3d Cir.
1980) (defendant unsuccessfully sought to introduce into evidence earlier statement made by wit-
ness, who refused to testify on the ground of his privilege against self incrimination, as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule); United States v. De Palma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (denial
of defendant's motion for admission into evidence of defense witnesses' grand jury testimony
pursuant to FED. R. Ewa 804(b)(5)).
See cases cited at note 10 supra.
' 4 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law ... ."
15 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 564-65 (1965) (Warren, C. J., concurring).
16 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
" See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
'a See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
19 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
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recognized as essential to a fair trial" to ensure defendants a fair opportunity to
present an effective defense.
The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, recognized that the right to
a fair trial may be violated when defendants are denied a fair opportunity to
develop evidence in their favor in order to present an effective defense. In
Rovario v. United States 21 for example, the Supreme Court reversed a defendant's
conviction for violating a federal narcotics law because the prosecutor had re-
fused to disclose the identity of an informant. 22 The incriminating evidence at
the trial consisted of the testimony of government witnesses concerning the
alleged illegal transaction between the defendant and the government in-
former." Before and during the trial, the defendant sought to learn the identity
of this informer, 24 but the government refused these requests on the ground of
its "informer's privilege." 25 In reversing the defendant's conviction on appeal,
the Supreme Court noted that the informer was the sole participant in the .
alleged illegal transaction and was, therefore, the only witness capable of either
amplifying or contradicting the testimony of the government's witnesses." The
Court held that the "informer's privilege" must give way "[w]here the dis-
closure of an informer's identity, or the contents of his communication, is rele-
vant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determina-
tion of a cause . . .""
In Brady v. Maryland," the Supreme Court in a different context reiterated
the idea that due process considerations prohibit governmental actions which
may frustrate a defendant's opportunity to present an effective defense. In
Brady, the defendant was convicted of murder." Subsequently, he discovered
that the prosecutor had withheld a confession by a co-defendant that would
have tended to exculpate him." The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Maryland Court of Appeals remanding the case for a retrial. 31 The Court
28 See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial).
21 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
22 Id. at 65-66.
23 Id. at 55.
2+ Id.
" Id. at 55-56. This "informer's privilege" consists of the government's privilege to
withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with enforcement of that law. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254
(1938).
26 353 U.S. at 64.
" Id. at 60-61.
28 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29 Id. at 84. Under state law, the jury was empowered to impose either a death sentence
or restrict the punishment to life imprisonment. Id. at 85. During his trial, Brady took the stand
and admitted his participation in the crime, but claimed that his co-defendant did the actual kill-
ing. Id. at 84. Nonetheless, the jury sentenced him to death.
'° Id. In this statement, Brady's co-defendant confessed to the actual homicide. If this
confession had been introduced into evidence during Brady's trial, the jury might have reduced
his sentence to life imprisonment.
" Id. at 86. The Maryland Court of Appeals found that the suppression of this evidence
denied the defendant due process and remanded the case for a retrial of the question of punish-
ment, not the question of guilt. Id. at 85.
January 1981]	 DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY	 303
observed that this suppression of evidence "casts the prosecutor in the role
of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of
justice . . . . "32 Consequently, the Court held that the suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused by the prosecutor, regardless of good or bad faith,
violates due process. 33
As these cases demonstrate, inherent in the due process guarantee of a fair
trial is the notion that a defendant is entitled to a fair opportunity to present an
effective defense. One important element of this notion is the defendant's abili-
ty to discover and employ material exculpatory evidence in his trial defense."
Indeed, as these cases implicitly affirm, the due process right to a fair trial may
become meaningless unless a defendant can obtain and use available testimony
on his behalf. Thus, the basic inquiry becomes whether a particular defendant
has been deprived of a fair trial because he was denied a fair opportunity to
present an effective defense.
Like the defendants in Rovario and Brady, a defendant in the immunity
context can be equally disadvantaged by a prosecutor's refusal to immunize
defense witnesses who invoke their privilege against self incrimination.
Without an immunity grant, these witnesses cannot be compelled to testify on
the defendant's behalf, thereby depriving the defendant of evidence that may
be vital to an effective defense. Moreover, the only apparent distinction be-
tween the defense witness immunity situation and those involved in the forego-
ing Supreme Court decisions is the awareness of the defendant concerning the
available evidence. To illustrate, in Rovario and Brady, the defendants had no
knowledge of the potentially exculpatory testimony that could be derived from
the prosecutor's evidence." In contrast, in the immunity context, a defendant
has typically been informed of or is aware of the available exculpatory testi-
mony which his witnesses would be willing to give on his behalf if they could do
so without incriminating themselves." Because of the prosecutor's refusal to
immunize these witnesses, however, the defendant may be totally unable to use
32 Id. at 88.
" Id. at 87.
34 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03. See also Every Man's Evidence,
supra note 7, at 1213; Re-examination, supra note 7, at 84-85.
35 For example, the defendant in Rovario did not argue that he knew that the govern-
ment's informer could provide testimony helpful to his defense. Instead, he contended that, as a
matter of fundamental fairness, the prosecutor should be required to disclose the informer's iden-
tity so that he could examine the informer and discover whether the informer's testimony could
assist his defense. See 353 U.S. at 58. Similarly, in Brady the defendant was unaware that the pro-
secutor had suppressed an out-of-court statement made by his co-defendant which exculpated the
defendant. This statement did not actually come to the defendant's attention until after he had
been tried, convicted, and sentenced, and after his conviction had been affirmed. See 373 U.S. at
84.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1978) (where the
defendant relied upon prior admissions made by witnesses, whose testimony he sought to com-
pel, to the FBI and the grand jury to support his claim for defense witness immunity); United
States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1976) (where the court observed that the defend-
ant had planned his defense around the testimony of a prospective witness who, prior to invoking
the fifth amendment privilege, was prepared to give exculpatory testimony in the defendant's
behalf).
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this testimony in his defense. The ultimate consequence of the different situa-
tions is identical — a defendant is tried and convicted without the benefit of all
available evidence to employ in his favor. Under these circumstances, a de-
fendant's inability to compel this testimony by an immunity grant can have as
devastating an effect on his defense as those which concerned the courts in
Bavaria and Brady.
Consequently, in light of a defendant's inability to compel exculpatory
testimony from witnesses who invoke the fifth amendment privilege, a prosecu-
tor's refusal to grant defense witness immunity can deprive the defendant of a
fair opportunity to present an effective defense." Moreover, the government
may actually benefit strategically, to the detriment of the defendant, by its re-
fusal to immunize defense witnesses who could provide helpful testimony to the
defense of the accused. Absent a grant of defense witness immunity, the de-
fendant may be unable to marshal sufficient evidence in his favor to present an
effective defense. 38 To this extent, the due process rule of a fair trial cannot be
satisfied and the essential task of the proceedings, the search for the truth, 39 is
likely to be frustrated. The result of the trial essentially becomes dependent
upon the prosecutor's decision whether to make exculpatory testimony avail-
able to the defense by exercising its statutory immunity power.
Although decided in a different factual context for immunity, the Supreme
Court's decision in Chambers v. Mississippi" furnishes further support for the
principle that due process may be violated when a defendant is denied a fair op-
portunity to present available testimony in his behalf. The defendant in
Chambers, during his trial for murder, sought to cross-examine his own witness
who had orally confessed on several previous occasions to committing the crime
for which the defendant was charged.'" The defendant, however, was pre-
vented from doing this by the state's common law "voucher rule" which pro-
hibited the impeachment of one's own witness. 42 The defendant then at-
tempted to introduce the testimony of several witnesses to whom the confes-
sions allegedly had been made." This second attempt to introduce the exculpa-
tory evidence was frustrated by the state's hearsay rules," and the defendant
was ultimately convicted." Recognizing the crucial importance of the excluded
" Fairness of the trial is further jeopardized when a defendant who is entirely powerless
to compel testimony in his favor by an immunity grant is convicted solely on the strength of testi-
mony compelled from witnesses immunized by the prosecutor. See Earl v. United States, 361
F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 364 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane), cm.
denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967) (dictum suggesting that due process as applied may be violated where
prosecutor has statutorily immunized government witnesses while, at the same time, refusing to
grant immunity to defense witnesses).
38 For example, see the factual discussion of Earl v. United States at text and notes 94-98
infra.
39 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also United States v. Turkish,
623 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1980).
4° 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
41 Id. at 288-93.
42
 Id. at 294.
43 Id. at 292.
44 Id. at 292-94.
'" Id. at 285.
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testimony, 46
 the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and held that
Chambers' right to a fair trial had been violated because he was not given a fair
opportunity to present an effective defense.•
The due process violation found in Chambers — the denial of a fair oppor-
tunity to present available exculpatory evidence in one's defense — lends sup-
port to the argument for defense witness immunity. In each instance, the de-
fendants are powerless to present testimony on their behalf. In Chambers, the
source of the defendant's helplessness was the state and its strict adherence to
evidentiary rules designed to protect the factfinder from hearing typically
unreliable evidence." In the immunity context, it is the government's refusal
to exercise its statutory immunity power which renders the defendant power-
less to obtain the exculpatory testimony for his defense. In the first situation,
the Supreme Court weighed the right to a fair opportunity to present an effec-
tive defense against the state's interest in its evidentiary rules and found the
former paramount. 49
 Accordingly, in the immunity context, Chambers would
appear to call for a similar weighing of a defendant's right to present an effec-
tive defense through a grant of defense witness immunity against the state's in-
terest in opposing such a grant. Thus, although Chambers may be factually dis-
tinguishable, its underlying rationale for determining whether a due process
violation has occurred when a defendant is tried and convicted without having
been given a fair opportunity to employ available exculpatory testimony in his
defense applies with equal force to the immunity situation.
Once one perceives the true constitutional basis which supports a defend-
ant's claim for defense witness immunity — the due process right to a fair trial
— the considerations raised by a defendant's request for defense witness im-
munity no longer appear novel. The issue becomes not whether a defendant
has a constitutional right" to the immunized testimony of his witnesses, but
rather whether the due process right to a fair trial requires that, under certain cir-
cumstances, a court provide a defendant with available exculpatory evidence
by a grant of witness immunity. Thus, courts no longer need be troubled with
the proposition of establishing a new or unique constitutional right in this area,
but merely concerned with the creation of a new remedy to protect an estab-
lished right. 5 ' Viewed in this light, once the same due process considerations
already well-founded in the law are examined, the issue raised by a request for
defense witness immunity becomes capable of clearer resolution.
Yet, recognition that due process concepts are broad enough to require the
provision of immunity to defense witnesses does not necessarily mean that such
46 Id. at 297. In this regard, the Court stated, "No the extend that [the witness'] sworn
confession tended to incriminate him, it tended also to exculpate Chambers." Id.
* 7 Id. at 302.
46 Id. at 295-98.
49 Id. at 302-03.
" See, e.g., United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1974)
(no merit to argument that a defendant has a constitutional right to have immunity conferred
upon a defense witness who exercises his fifth amendment privilege); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215,
1222 (4th Cir. 1973) (no constitutional right to defense witness immunity).
51 Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1980).
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immunity will be granted in every case. Instead, the courts must balance 52 the
defendant's right to a fair trial against the competing interests contained in a
grant of such immunity." If legitimate governmental interests would be in-
fringed, the courts must act cautiously in determining whether defense witness
immunity should be provided for a defendant.
B. Balancing the Interests: Transactional Versus Use Immunity
Several reasons have been given to justify the prosecutor's refusal to grant
defense witness immunity. One rationale is that this type of immunity grant
would have a detrimental effect on the public welfare" and the way in which
the public perceives the role of prosecutor." Thus, it is contended that, by
allowing a defendant to immunize his witnesses on the pretext that they will
give valuable exculpatory testimony in his behalf, the defendant is given the
power to confer absolution from prosecution on all of his cronies in crime. 56 As
one court has stated, "[a] person suspected of crime should not be empowered
to give his confederates an immunity bath."" Where defense witnesses are im-
munized by a prosecutor exercising his statutory immunity power the public's
52 This balancing process was given implicit recognition by the Supreme Court in
Rovario and Chambers. In Rovario, the Court stated that no "fixed rule" of disclosure was defen-
sible. Rather, the Court reasoned that the problem "is one that calls for balancing the public in-
terest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare a defense."
353 U.S. at 62. And in Chambers the Court apparently applied a balancing test to determine if due
Process consideratons required an exception to be made to the state's evidentiary rules. Con-
cluding that the state had no legitimate interest in the "rigid application" of these rules, the
Court held that they could not be "applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." 410
U.S. at 302. See generally Re-examination, supra note 7, at 86-88.
" Since the Supreme Court has held that a grant of immunity under the Act of 1970
constitutionally supplants a witness' fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination, see
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972), the witness' interest in being compelled to
give testimony for the defense is adequately protected. Thus, this note will not focus on the in-
terest of the immunized defense witness. Instead, only the government's interest in opposing a
grant of defense witness immunity will be examined. It may be noted, though, that the witness'
testimony which is compelled under a grant of immunity can expose him to both criminal and
noncriminal consequences. Insofar as the Supreme Court has determined that the fifth amend-
ment protects a witness solely against criminal results, see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605
(1896), the possibility of noncriminal consequences is irrelevant to the witness' interest in a grant
of defense witness immunity.
54 See Bauer, Reflections on the Role of Statutory Immunity in the Criminal Justice System, 671
OF GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 143, 152 (1976) thereinafter cited as Bauer]. This author is of the
opinion that every witness who seeks immunity is himself guilty of criminal acts. If the power to
grant immunity was given to defendants, the author questions what would prevent them from
conferring such immunity grants on their co-defendants in order to "beat the rap." He con-
cludes that, since every grant of immunity entails the social cost involved in not prosecuting an
admitted criminal, the decision to immunize should not be placed in the hands of defendants who
could choose to confer immunity on the basis of friendship or self-interest. Id.
55 Cf. Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment:
"Criminal Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A Rational Accommodation?", 67 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 155 (1976) (author observes public's perception that prosecutors are too le-
nient in immunizing potential government witnesses).
i6
 See Bauer, supra note 54, at 152.
67 In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).
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perception of the prosecutor, as the protector of the public interest by seeing
that all deserving criminals are properly prosecuted, 58 is damaged. Another
reason for sustaining a prosecutor's refusal is that a defendant's request for
defense witness immunity infringes on the prosecutor's interest in prosecuting
both the defendant and, at some later date, his witnesses who are also partici-
pants in crime. 58 In short, a grant of defense witness immunity would invade
the prosecutor's discretion over the manner and the timing of its prosecutions."
The significance accorded to these governmental interests, however, will
necessarily vary depending on the scope of the immunity sought for a defense
witness."
Prior to 1970, a number of federal statutes provided grants of "trans-
actional immunity" to witnesses." Transactional immunity absolves a witness
from prosecution for any matter about which he testifies while under the im-
munity grant." In several early decisions involving immunity grants, the
Supreme Court held that anything less in scope than transactional immunity
was insufficient to supplant a witness' fifth amendment Privilege against self
incrimination and therefore could not be used to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege." The interests of the prosecutor in preventing wholesale im-
munity baths and maintaining complete discretion over the timing of prosecu-
tions become significant when the immunity sought for defense witnesses is
transactional in scope." This is because a grant of transactional immunity to a
defense witness forces the prosecutor to forego prosecuting the witness for any
crimes that his trial testimony reveals he committed." Thus, under a grant of
transactional immunity to a defense witness, the possibility of an immunity
bath for a defendant's accomplices in crime becomes a reality. To this extent, a
58 Cf. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 1.1(a) (1974)
("The office of prosecutor is an agency of the executive branch of government which is charged
with the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed and enforced in order to maintain the
rule of the law").
" See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1976); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534
(D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1273-74; Columbia Note, supra note 7,
at 960-61.
6° See Re-examination, supra note 7, at 80.
" See United States v. Morrision, 535 F.2d 223, 228-29 (1976); United States v. La
Duca, 447 F. Supp. 779, 786 (D.N. J. 1978). See also Re-examination supra note 7, at 80.
62
 For a listing of these statutes, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 1444-45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
65 See, e.g., The Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443,
repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, S 245, 84 Stat. 931,
which provided in part: "No person shall be prosecuted . . . for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing, concerning which he may testify . . ." See also Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 451-53.
64
 See, e.g. , Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892); Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1896); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
65 See United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Harvard
Note, supra note 7, at 1273-74.
66 Under a typical transactional immunity statute, if a witness takes the stand and
testifies to several criminal acts he has participated in, he is protected against any criminal pro-
secution for those acts. Thus, these types of statutes have the effect of giving the witness who is re-
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grant of defense witness immunity places a substantial restraint upon the
government's discretion to prosecute. A narrower grant of immunity may,
however, reduce significantly the infringement on the prosecutor's interest in
prosecuting the witness at a later date.
In 1970, Congress provided this narrower scope of immunity by enacting
the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act." This Act created one comprehensive
federal immunity statute applicable to all cases involving a violation of any
quired to testify under the immunity grant, an "immunity bath" if he admits to criminal ac-
tivities during his testimony.
A good illustration of such immunity baths occurred in a case which arose under the first
federal immunity statute. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155 (1857). In this case, two clerks in the
Department of Interior had embezzled $2,000,000.00 in government funds and then had arrang-
ed to testify before a House Committee, where they disclosed their ciminal acts under a grant of
transactional immunity. When the government attempted to prosecute, the court dismissed the
case, holding that the clerks were immune from prosecution. See 42 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong.,
2d Sess. 364 (1860) (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
6' 18 U.S.C. SS 6001-6005 (1976) (passed as part of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926). This Note will deal primarily with the provisions of
sections 6002 and 6003, reprinted below, as they relate to a grant of immunity for testifying
before a judicial tribunal. Section 6001 of the Act contains definitions of terms used in the statute.
Section 6004 authorizes immunity grants to witnesses in certain administrative proceedings. Sec-
tion 6005 authorizes immunity grants to witnesses testifying at congressional hearings. Section
6002 of the Act provides as follows:
5 6002. Immunity generally.
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to —
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States . . . and the person presiding
over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under
this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other infor-
mation compelled under the order (or any information directly or in-
directly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Section 6003 provides as follows:
S 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings.
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or
provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the
United States or a grand jury of the United States, the_United States district court
for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in
accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United
States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testi-
mony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as pro-
vided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney
General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judg-
ment —
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necesary
to the public interest; and
(2) such 'individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other
information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
Id.
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federal law." The Act substituted "use and derivative use immunity" for the
previously authorized transactional immunity. 69 As the legislative history in-
dicates, Congress intended that witnesses granted immunity under this Act
would only be protected from having their testimony or any evidence derived
therefrom used against them in a subsequent prosecution. 70 Unlike transac-
tional immunity, therefore, "use immunity" does not absolve the witness from
prosecution for any crimes revealed by his immunized testimony." Instead, it
merely prohibits a prosecutor from introducing the testimony or any derivative
information as evidence in a subsequent prosecution for those crimes." This
narrower scope of immunity was thought to better accommodate the interests
of the witnesses and the government by eliminating immunity baths, while still
providing the witnesses with protection from prosecutions based solely on the
compelled testimony or any of its fruits."
Two years later, the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United Stales,'* approved
the Act's adoption of use immunity." After examining the history of federal
immunity statutes and its own precedents concerning immunity grants," the
Supreme Court held that immunity from use and derivative use was coexten-
sive with the scope of the privilege against self incrimination and was therefore
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of that privilege." The Court noted
that the fifth amendment privilege was not intended to inhibit the effective en-
forcement of criminal laws by protecting those who violate them." On the con-
trary, an immunized witness could still be subsequently prosecuted for any
crimes that his immunized testimony revealed he committed, but the privilege
against self incrimination requires the prosecutor to satisfy a "heavy
burden!" 79 The prosecutor has the affirmative duty to prove that all the
evidence it proposes to use in the subsequent prosecution of the witness was
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testi-
mony."
68
 By its enactment, the Act repealed all other federal immunity statutes and substi-
tuted a comprehensive statutory scheme to serve all federal purposes. See H.R. REP. NO. 149,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970).
69
 Section 6002 of the Act, see note 67 supra, provides in pertinent part that "no
testimony or other information compelled under the order . (or any information directly or in-
directly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in
any criminal case . . . ." 18 U.S.C. S 6002 (1976). The scope of immunity sanctioned by this
Act has been termed "use and derivative use immunity." See Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 449 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as "use immunity"].
70 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970).
71 The legislative history of section 6002 clearly indicates that Congress intended the
protection afforded by a grant of use immunity to be narrower than that of transactional immuni-
ty. See id.
" See note 67 supra.
73 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 62, at 1446.
74 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
73
 Id. at 462.
76
 Id. at 443-59.
" Id. at 459.
76 Id. at 453.
79 Id. at 461-62.
0° Id. at 460.
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Accordingly, in theory, a grant of use immunity under the Act of 1970
leaves the witness and the prosecutor in the same position as if the witness had
never taken the stand to testify. 8 ' The government does, however, bear the ad-
ditional burden of proving the independence of its sources in any subsequent
prosecution. 82 In some situations, this burden may prove insurmountable; the
prosecutor will be unable to establish the independence of his evidence to the
court's satisfaction." Where this result obtains, a grant of use immunity to a
defense witness may mean that the prosecutor will be foreclosed from pro-
secuting the immunized witness. Under these circumstances, a grant of use im-
munity to a defense witness becomes tantamount to a grant of transactional im-
munity and the government's interests which would be infringed by such a
grant should be accorded substantial weight.
Nevertheless, in many cases, the government will be able to satisfy its
burden under Kastigara4 and valid prosecutions of immunized defense witnesses
need not be sacrificed in order to effectuate a defendant's right to a fair trial. By
providing for the possible subsequent prosecution of immunized witnesses,
therefore, Kastigar reduces the invasion of prosecutorial discretion potentially
occasioned by a defendant's request that his witnesses be immunized. As a
result, /Caste-gar lessens the weight accorded to the governmental interests 85 in-
volved in a grant of defense witness immunity. Under certain circumstances,"
this may tip the scale in favor of effectuating a defendant's right to a fair trial
by providing his witnesses with such immunity so that the defendant can use
their testimony in presenting his defense. Since the significance of the. govern-
mental interests involved in a grant of defense witness immunity, however, will
necessarily vary from case to case, the courts will have to weigh these interests
carefully in each instance in order to determine whether they outweigh the de-
fendant's need for the testimony to present an effective defense under the due
Al See id. at 458-59, 462.
82 See id. at 460-62. For a general discussion of the evidentiary burden faced by the pro-
secutor with respect to future prosecutions of immunized witnesses, see Note, Federal Witness hn-
munity Problems and Practices Under 18 U.S.C. 45 6002-6003, 14 AM. GRIM, L. REV, 275, 282-86
(1976).
To determine whether the prosecutor has satisfied this evidentiary burden, a pre-trial
hearing is held to examine the evidence proposed to be used. Here, the prosecutor must establish
by a preponderance of proof that its evidence was derived from legitimate sources independent of
the immunized testimony. Suppression of the evidence will result from the prosecutor's failure to
sustain this burden and dismissal of the charges may even be necessary. See id, at 284.
83 See, e.g., United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
84
 See, e.g., United States v. Kuehn, 562 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor's
burden of showing lack of taint under Kastigar was met); Untied States v. Catalano, 491 F.2d
268, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974) (prosecutor had satisfied burden under
Kastigar even though the prosecutor had heard the witness' prior immunized testimony with
regard to crimes for which the witness was convicted); United States v. Meyers, 339 F. Supp.
1154, 1060-61 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Kastigar burden satisfied even though prosecutor had seen a
newspaper article which paraphrased the immunized witness' testimony).
83 See text and notes at notes 55-60 supra.
88 See text at note 190 infra.
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process guarantee of a fair trial. When the court determines that the balance
tips in the defendant's favor, it must then decide whether it has the power to
provide the specific remedy sought by the defendant, a grant of immunity for
his witnesses. The next section of this Note will examine how the federal courts
have treated this issue.
II. THE TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE OF DEFENSE WITNESS
IMMUNITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Traditional Approach: Denial of any Remedy
Courts facing the issue of defense witness immunity have adopted a
number of ways to handle a defendant's request for an immunity grant for his
witnesses. The traditional approach of the federal courts is simply to deny any
relief whatsoever." The courts following this approach tend to view a defend-
ant's application for defense witness immunity as raising a claim to a novel and
unique constitutional right" rather than merely the prescription of a new
remedy to effectuate the well established due process right to a fair tria1. 89 Find-
ing no specific support in the Constitution for the creation of this new "right,"
the courts following this approach summarily refuse to grant the requested re-
lief." As a result, these courts completely ignore the necessity of balancing the
defendant's interest in a fair trial against the governmental interests involved
in a grant of defense witness immunity. To this extent, the significance of
Kastigar is largely overlooked.
Earl u. United States, 91 decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, provides a good illustration of the application of this type of ap-
proach. In Earl, the court held that a defendant has no constitutional right to
defense witness immunity. Although the facts of Earl involved a transactional
immunity statute," the court's holding is still relied upon by the majority of
federal courts to deny requests for defense witness immunity without engaging
in a thorough analysis of the relevant due process considerations."
In Earl, the defendant and an alleged accomplice, Scott, were charged
with violating a federal narcotics law. 94
 During the trial, an undercover agent
testified that he had purchased contraband from Scott and a man who the agent
later identified as Earl." Earl attempted to call Scott as his witness, but Scott
" See cases cited in note 8 supra.
" See cases cited in note 50 supra.
89 See text and note at note 51 supra.
9° See note 8 supra.
91
 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir.), reh. denied, 364 F.2d 666 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921
(1967).
92 See 18 U.S.C. S 1406 (1964), repealed by 18 U.S.C. SS 6001-6005 (1976).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Daley,
549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 542 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1976);
Thompson v. Garrision, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d
1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1972).
94 361 F.2d at 532.
95 Id.
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asserted his privilege against self incrimination. 96 Earl then requested that the
prosecutor be ordered to grant statutory immunity to Scott to compel his testi-
mony alleging that, if he was immunized, Scott would admit that Earl had not
participated in the illegal transaction." This request was denied and Earl was
convicted." Earl appealed claiming that this refusal violated his rights under
due process.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Earl's
conviction. 99 Rejecting the defendant's argument that the prosecutor's refusal
to immunize Scott resulted in the suppression of evidence in violation of the
Brady rule,'" the court decided that Brady was inapplicable because the pro-
secutor had not affirmatively withheld a witness or concealed evidence."'
Finding that the facts of Earl raised a different issue than that presented in
Brady, the court stated:
What Appellant asks this Court to do is to command the Executive
Branch of government to exercise the statutory power of the Ex-
ecutive to grant immunity in order to secure relevant testimony.
This power is not inherent in the Executive and surely is not in-
herent in the judiciary. In the context of criminal justice, it is one of
the highest forms of discretion conferred by Congress on the Ex-
ecutive . . tot
Thus, the court concluded that it was powerless to compel the prosecutor to im-
munize a witness. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that it had
the power to create a judicial grant of immunity for Scott.'" The court rea-
soned that certain safeguards would be required to preclude abuses in such an
immunity grant.'" Viewing these considerations as involving a legislative
question, the court held that this type of immunity grant was beyond the power
of the judiciary.'"
so Id.
97 Id. In this offer Earl stated that Scott would admit that he did not know Earl, that
Earl had not been with him on the day in question and that he knew a third person who fre-
quented the same area and resembled Earl in appearance. Id.
98 Id.
94 Id. at 535. Chief Justice Burger, then circuit judge, wrote the majority opinion.
100 See text and notes at notes 29-33 supra.
10 ' 361 F.2d at 534. The court noted that the government had transported the witness
from prison and produced him in court, but that Scott himself had declined to testify. Id.
102 Id. The court observed that the prosecutor did not argue that Congress was powerless
to provide defendants with a comparable procedure to compel testimony, but rather only that
Congress had not done so. Id. This argument, however, overlooks the important due process
considerations raised by this issue.
11" Id.
104 Id. The court stated that "the complexity and difficulty of evaluating the impact of
that course [providing judicial immunity] suggest at once the inadequacy of the facilities avail-
able to the judiciary to make the assessment." Id. It will be argued in this Note that the courts are
capable of such an assessment and that it is their responsibility to make it. See text and notes at
notes 185-226 infra.
"1 Id. In a footnote, the court stated that had the prosecutor secured testimony by grant-
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As the decision in Earl demonstrates, the traditional approach to this issue
characterizes a defendant's request for defense witness immunity as involving a
claim to a new constitutional right rather than merely the creation of a new
remedy to preserve an established right — the due process right to a fair
trial.' 06 The courts following this approach conclude that since Congress has
vested exclusive authority in the prosecutor to initiate immunity grants, the
judiciary is powerless to provide immunity to defense witnesses. Consequently,
this approach forecloses any consideration of the power of a court to protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial. In so doing, it ignores the essential need for a
balancing test in this area and overlooks the significance of Kastigar in resolving
the issue.
B. Recent Attempts to Protect a Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial
Recently, a few federal courts have recognized the due process issues
raised by a defendant's request for defense witness immunity.'" These courts
discern that the question at stake involves a defendant's due process right to a
fair trial. Therefore, where a determination is made that a defendant's inability
to compel testimony in his behalf by an immunity grant results in a denial of
the due process guarantee of a fair trial, these courts conclude that they have
the power to provide a remedy by virtue of the due process clause. This deter-
mination, however, is accomplished by various methods. One consists of ascer-
taining whether the prosecutor's refusal to grant the requested defense witness
ing immunity to a witness, an argument could have been made on behalf of Earl that this use of
the statutory immunity power denied Earl due process. Id. at n. 1. This statement, although die-
turn, nevertheless reflects the court's misconception of the due process considerations involved in
a defendant's request for defense witness immunity. In this situation, it is not the fact that the
government possesses the power to immunize certain witnesses or even that it has used this power
to its advantage which is critical, Rather, it is the fact that the defendant, because of his ability to
compel exculpatory testimony from his witnesses, may be denied a fair trial in violation of his due
process rights that is the important consideration.
Earl's petition for a rehearing en bane was denied by an equally divided court. 364 F.2d
666 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In dissenting from the denial, Judge Leventhal noted that the court's deci-
sion that it was powerless to grant immunity to the defense witness failed to answer the argument
that there was "unfairness to the defendant in denying availability of testimony." Id. He
specifically regretted that the trial court had not made any findings as to whether any interest of
the government would be infringed by a grant of defense witness immunity. This inquiry, he
stated, "bears on the fairness of the prosecutor's course." Id.
ISO Another case which illustrates this approach is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1974). In Allstate,
the court refused to compel a prosecutor to immunize a defense witness under the Immunity Act
of 1970. Rejecting the defendant's argument that Earl was distinguishable because it had in-
volved transactional immunity as compared to use immunity under the Act of 1970, the court
simply replied that this was "a distinction without a difference." Id. at 495. The court felt that it
was precluded from compelling the prosecutor to grant immunity or from granting it on its own
because this would intrude upon the prosecutorial discretion of the executive branch. The court,
therefore, concluded that there was no merit "to the argument that a defendant has a constitu-
tional right to have immunity conferred upon a defense witness who exercises his privilege
against self incrimination." Id.
107 See note 10 .supra.
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immunity results in an "unfair trial." 8
 The other involves determining
whether that refusal is "deliberately intended to distort the judicial fact finding
process." 169
 In the former method, the court weighs the conflicting interests of
the government and the defendant in order to decide whether the defendant
has been denied a fair trial by his inability to compel testimony through an im-
munity grant. In the latter method, the court simply determines whether the
prosecutor, by refusing the defendant's request that his witnesses be immun-
ized, has deliberately intended to conceal relevant evidence from the fact
finder.
1. The Ninth Circuit's Approach: The Fair Trial Standard
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Alessio"° was
one of the first federal courts willing to acknowledge that a defendant's right to
a fair trial may require that, under certain circumstances, use immunity be
provided for his witnesses who assert their fifth amendment privilege against
self incrimination. The court in Alessio adopted a balancing test to determine
whether the prosecutor's refusal to immunize a defense witness coupled with
the defendant's inability to compel testimony on his behalf violated the defend-
ant's due process right to a fair trial. The court examined the fairness of the
trial by weighing the defendant's need for the testimony against the govern-
ment's interest in refusing to immunize the defense witness.
In Alessio, the defendant was charged with violating a federal extortion
statute."' During the trial, the defendant sought use immunity for three
defense witnesses who had threatened to invoke their privileges against self in-
crimination if called to testify."' The prosecutor refused this request and the
defendant was convicted." 3
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the conviction." 4
 The court noted that an interpretation of the fifth
amendment to allow defendants to demand defense witness immunity would
unacceptably invade the prosecutor's discretion to prosecute those witnesses." 3
The court, however, reasoned that "whatever power the government possesses
it may not be exercised in a manner which denies the defendant the due process
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment . .." 16
 Consequently, the court held
that that the key question is whether the defendant was denied a fair trial
because of the government's refusal to seek immunity for his witnesses."' Ap-
plying this standard, the court found that the defendant had not been denied a
1 °8 See United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976), discussed in text at notes
110-20 supra.
1 °9 See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), discussed in text at notes
123-36 supra.
"° 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976).
1 " Id. at 1080.
119
 Id. at 1081.
" 5 Id. at 1080-81.
114
 Id. at 1083.
"3 Id. at 1082. .
" 6 Id.
" 7 Id.
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fair trial because the testimony he sought from his witnesses was cumulative of
that which had already been presented to the jury." 8
As is apparent from the decision in Alessio, the Ninth Circuit's approach
does not mean that the prosecutor's refusal to grant defense witness immunity
coupled with the defendant's inability to compel the testimony in his behalf will
always result in a denial of due process. Rather, the court will balance the com-
peting interests of the government and the defendant involved in the particular
case to determine whether defendant has been denied a fair trial. According to
the decision in Alessio, one of the major elements in weighing the defendant's
interest in a fair trial is his actual need for the testimony." 8 If the defendant
fails to establish any significant need for the immunized testimony of his
witnesses, then the court will strike the balance in favor of the government and
deny the defendant his requested relief.' 20
The approach employed by the Ninth Circuit, therefore, avoids placing
any restrictions on the prosecutor's discretion to grant statutory immunity
where the exercise of that discretion does not prejudice a defendant's due pro-
cess right to a fair trial. Conversely, where the exercise of that discretion along
with the defendant's inability to compel his witnesses to testify in his defense
does prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial, the court has the power to pro-
vide an appropriate remedy to cure the due process violation. Thus, this type of
approach rejects the majority view that a court is powerless in all circumstances
to remedy the disparate treatment accorded to defendants with regard to im-
munity grants for witnesses by the Immunity Act of 1970. Nevertheless, since
there have been no cases in the Ninth Circuit providing the court with an op-
portunity to exercise its remedial power in the immunity context, the question
of exactly what remedy that court would apply when it finds a due process
violation remains open.'" In contrast, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
Lle Id. Typically, a request for defense witness immunity will be made prior to trial and
before the defendant has introduced the testimony of any of his witnesses. To this extent, the cir-
cuit court's determination that the witness' testimony would have been cumulative of other
defense testimony can only be made in retrospect when the case is on appeal from the lower
court's refusal to grant defense witness immunity. Therefore, the court's holding did not address
the issue of what standards the lower court should have applied to determine whether to grant or
deny the defendant's request.
" 9 See id.
10 Further support for this test can be found in a subsequent decision by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Carmen, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1978). There, the court
held that the prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity did not deny the defendant due process
under Alessio because the defendant had failed to call his witness to testify. The court reasoned
that his failure rendered speculative any argument in support of granting the witness immunity
since it was uncertain whether the witness would invoke the fifth amendment privilege if called to
testify. Id. at 561. Hence, the defendant had failed to demonstrate sufficient need for the im-
munized testimony of his witness. Sec also United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978)
(unnecessary to decide due process issue raised by defendant's request for defense witness im-
munity because defendant failed to subpoena witness).
' 21 This question has recently been answered by one district court applying the "fair
trial" standard of Alessio. See United States v. De Palma, 476 F. Supp. 775, 782 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), appeal pending sub nom. United States v. Horwitz, No. 79-1315 (2d Cir.) (testimony of im-
munized government witness will be excluded at new trial unless government grants use im-
munity to defense witnesses).
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although employing a different standard to determine whether there has been a
due process violation, has developed at least one remedy to be applied where it
finds that a defendant has been denied his right to a fair trial.
2. The Third Circuit's Approach: Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently indicated a will-
ingness to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial by providing a remedy when
it finds that the prosecutor's refusal to grant defense witness immunity,
coupled with the defendant's inability to compel testimony from his witnesses
on his behalf without the use of such immunity grant, violates that right.
Unlike the "fair trial" standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit whereby the
court engages in a balancing test to determine if the defendant has been denied
a fair trial, the Third Circuit has adopted a different approach to determine
whether a due process violation has occurred. This approach consists of
deciding whether the prosecutor's refusal to immunize a defense witness is
deliberately intended to distort the judicial fact finding process. Where the
court finds that it is, it will order the prosecutor to grant statutory use immuni-
ty to the defense witness or suffer a judgment of acquittal for the defendant.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first developed this
remedy in United States v. Morrison 122 to protect a defendant's sixth amendment
right to compulsory process, it has recently applied it in the United States v. Her-
mare" to protect a defendant's due process right to a fair trial.' 24 In Herman, the
court considered a defendant's arguments that the prosecutor's refusal to im-
munize his witnesses, whose testimony allegedly would have exculpated him,
violated his rights under both the compulsory process clause of the sixth
amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amendment.'" The court
initially rejected the defendant's contention that he had a general sixth amend-
ment right to defense witness immunity.' 26 The court distinguished its holding
in Morrison by noting that Morrison involved prosecutorial misconduct resulting
in the witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege, and that the
'" 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976). In Morrison, the defendant was charged with conspiracy
to distribute narcotics. As part of his defense, he planned to call a witness who would testify that
she, rather than the defendant, had been involved in the conspiracy. Before the witness could
testify, however, the prosecutor confronted her outside of court and threatened her with prosecu-
tion for perjury if she falsely incriminated herself in order to exculpate the defendant, Thereafter,
when called to testify, the witness refused to answer a number of questions by invoking her fifth
amendment privilege and the defendant was convicted. Id. at 224-25.
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the prosecutor's
actions had deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment right to compulsory process. Noting
that the approval of use immunity in Kastigar removed much of the rationale behind the tradi-
tional approach because a witness could still be prosecuted if the government could sustain its
burden, the court concluded that it had the power to provide the defendant with a remedy. The
court remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal unless the prosecutor offered
use immunity to the defense witness for her potentially incriminating testimony concerning her
participation in the conspiracy. Id. at 228-29.
123 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913 (1979).
174 Id. at 1204.
12S Id. at 1199.
18 Id. at 1200.
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remedy applied there was only a cure for that misconduct.'" In contrast, in
Herman the court observed that it could find no such instances of prosecutorial
abuse.' 28
 Absent such proof, the court concluded that the defendant had no
general sixth amendment right to demand that his witnesses be immunized.' 29
Next, the court considered the defendant's argument that he was deprived
of his due process right to a fair trial by the prosecutor's refusal to immunize
his witnesses."° Rather than adopting a balancing test to resolve the issue as
the Ninth Circuit had done in Alessio, the court decided that the basic inquiry
was whether the prosecutor had exercised his statutory discretion under the
Immunity Act of 1970 in a way that violated due process.'" Recognizing the
"strong tradition of deference to prosecutorial discretion . .. and . . . the
necessary tendency of the executive branch to exercise that discretion in ways
that make it more likely that defendants will be convicted,'' 32
 the court rea-
soned that a substantial evidentiary burden must be met by a defendant re-
questing the court to compel the prosecutor to immunize his witnesses.' 33 The
court concluded that:
[t]he defendant must be prepared to show that the government's
decisions were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the
judicial fact finding process. Where such a showing is made, the
court has inherent remedial power to require that the distortion be
redressed by requiring a grant of use immunity to defense witnesses
as an alternative to dismissal.' 34
After setting forth this evidentiary standard, however, the court found that the
facts of the case did not demonstrate such a showing.'" Therefore, the court af-
firmed the defendant's conviction." 6
Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that a
prosecutor's refusal to immunize defense witnesses may, under certain circum-
stances, deny a defendant his due process right to a fair trial. Although recog-
nizing that a court seriously encroaches upon a prosecutor's discretion when it
orders him to grant statutory use immunity to defense witnesses, the Third
Circuit has, nonetheless, affirmed the availability of this particular remedy to
protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. This remedy, however, is conditioned
upon an evidentiary showing by a defendant that the prosecutor's refusal to
grant immunity to his witnesses was deliberately intended to distort the fact
finding process.
127 Id. at 1199-1200. See note 122 supra.
113 Id.
121 Id.
13° Id. at 1203-04.
131
 Id. at 1203.
131 Id. at 1203-04.
'" Id. at 1204.
' 34 Id.
"s Id. The court reasoned that "so far as it appears, the decision to immunize (the pro-
secution witnesses] was unrelated to the decision first to prosecute and later to drop the prosecu-
tion of the [defense witnesses]." Id.
1 " Id.
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In order to sustain this burden, a defendant will have to prove two things
to the trial court. First, he must demonstrate that the excluded testimony is
relevant to his defense." 7 Unlike the balancing approach employed by the
Ninth Circuit, the availability of a remedy to cure the prosecutor's refusal to
grant defense witness immunity under this theory does not have to be predi-
cated upon a showing that the testimony is clearly exculpatory or otherwise
essential to the defense.' 38 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted,
where the prosecutor's refusal constitutes an abuse of discretion, "it cannot be
held that the jury would not have believed the testimony or that the error was
harmless. " "9
Second, a defendant must also demonstrate that the prosecutor's refusal to
immunize his defense witnesses was made with the deliberate intention of dis-
torting the judicial fact finding process.'" This evidentiary requirement will
generally be difficult for a defendant to sustain. Part of the diffiCulfylies—With—a
defendant's limited fact gathering ability. A defendant is usually unable to ob-
tain direct evidence concerning the intention of the prosecutor in refusing his
request for defense witness immunity. Consequently, a defendant will have to
rely on circumstantial evidence surrounding the prosecutor's refusal to sustain
his evidentiary burden. Another difficulty arises from the Third Circuit's
failure to explain what types of circumstantial evidence surrounding the pro-
secutor's refusal will be sufficient to sustain this burden. 14 ' Although it is still
too early to determine exactly what type of evidentiary showing will be re-
quired under the Third Circuit's approach, it is certain that if a defendant can
sustain this burden, the trial court will enter a judgment of acquittal for the
defendant unless the prosecutor grants statutory use immunity to his witnesses.
In sum, the reduced scope of the use immunity adopted by Congress in
the Immunity Act of 1970 and approved by the Supreme Court in Kastigar
strongly supports an argument that the courts have the duty to protect a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial where that right outweighs the governmental inter-
ests in refusing to grant defense witness immunity. Yet, this narower scope of
immunity has had very little impact on changing the traditional rule, followed
' 37
 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 n.7 (3d Cir. 1980).
' 38 Id.
139 United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 1976).
"° See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1980).
"' Recently, in its decision in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964
(3d Cir. 1980), the Third Circuit has furnished some guidelines on sustaining this evidentiary
burden. In Smith, the court found that a defendant could meet this burden by demonstrating that
the prosecutor's refusal to immunize his defense witness was intimately connected to its strategy
for prosecuting the defendant's case. Id. at 969. To make this particular showing a defendant
could prove that the prosecution was aware that its case was inherently weak and that a grant of
immunity to defense witnesses might result in testimony which would be severely damaging to
the government's case. Id. Also, a defendant may be able to demonstrate that by refusing the re-
quest for defense witness immunity, the prosecutor not only prevented the witness from testifying
at the defendant's trial, but that this refusal also furnished the predicate for the prosecutor's ob-
jection to the admission of an earlier statement made by the witness outside of court. Id. Finally,
the defendant might argue that where the United States Attorney has no jurisdiction over the
defense witness, but refuses to consent to the immunity offered by the proper jurisdictional agen-
cy, this conduct suggests that the prosecutor deliberately intended to keep relevant evidence from
the fact finder. Id.
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by a majority of federal courts, that a court is powerless to provide a'remedy to
protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. This is because these courts view the
issue raised by a defendant's request for defense witness immunity as involving
a claim to a new constitutional right rather than the provision of a new type of
remedy to effectuate an established right. Thus, these courts overlook the need
for a balancing approach suggested by a line of Supreme Court decisions
which, in effect, weigh the defendant's interest in a fair trial against the govern-
ment's countervailing interests. As a result, they largely ignore the real
significance of Kastigar to the defense witness immunity situation.
Recently, however, the Ninth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals have
recognized that they have the power to provide a remedy in order to effectuate
a defendant's right to a fair trial where the prosecutor's refusal to immunize a
defense witness, coupled with the defendant's own inability to compel testi-
mony in his defense, violates that right. The Ninth Circuit, on the one hand,
has adopted a balancing approach to weigh the government's interest involved
in a grant of defense witness immunity against the defendant's need for the im-
munized testimony. Where the court determines that the absence of the im-
munized testimony deprives the defendant of a fair trial, presumably it will
provide a remedy, though it is too early to determine exactly what the remedy
will be. On the other hand, the Third Circuit has developed the remedy of
ordering the prosecutor to grant statutory immunity to a defense witness or suf-
fer a judgment of acquittal for the defendant. This remedy, however, has a ma-
jor limitation. It will only be applied where the court finds that the prosecutor
has abused his discretion in refusing to grant defense witness immunity thereby
violating the defendant's right to a fair trial. Thus, this remedy does not com-
pletely resolve the due process problems raised by a defendant's request for
defense witness immunity in the situation where there is no instance of prose-
cutorial misconduct.
Although the Ninth Circuit's decision in Alessi° implies that, in this par-
ticular situation, a court has the inherent power to provide a remedy to protect
a defendant's due process rights, that court has not been afforded the oppor-
tunity to develop this idea. Such a remedy, however, has been suggested by the
Third Circuit. In dicta contained in its decision in Herman, the Court of Ap-
peals recognized the possibility of such a remedy stemming from a court's in-
herent power to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial."' This remedy would
consist of "conferring a judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose
testimony is essential to an effective defense" of the defendant."' The next sec-
tion of this Note will examine this suggestion more fully and propose the cir-
cumstances under which the courts should exercise this power.
III. RESOLVING THE DUE PROCESS ISSUE: A PROPOSAL
As this Note has suggested, t44
 a defendant's request that his witnesses be
immunized so that they can be compelled to testify in his behalf clearly impli-
142 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978).
149 Id.
144 See text and notes at notes 14-51 supra. See also Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1980).
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cater the due process guarantee of a fair trial. Under this guarantee, the courts
have the duty to remedy a violation of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair
trial. To determine whether a defendant's inability to compel testimony in his
defense by a grant of immunity violates this right, a court must balance the de-
fendant's need for the testimony against the government's interest in opposing
a grant of defense witness immunity."' Where it decides that the balance
favors the defendant, a court must then determine exactly what remedy is ap-
propriate to effectuate the due process guarantee of a fair trial.
A. The Remedy: Judicial Use Immunity
Several remedies have been proposed by commentators to protect a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial within the immunity context.'" One such remedy
is that which the Third Circuit applied in Herman.' 47 A court would put the pro-
secutOr to an election either to statutorily immunize the defense witness whose
testimony is sought by a defendant or suffer a judgment of acquittal.'" Al-
though this particular remedy might be appropriate in certain situations, it is
improper in many instances where a defendant's right to a fair trial has been
violated because of his inability to compel testimony. As the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized, it should be applied only where the prosecutor's
refusal to grant defense witness immunity has been made with the deliberate
14 ' See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980). See
generally Re-examination, supra note 7; Columbia Note, supra note 7.
One recent commentator has recast the issue under discussion as the defendant's con-
stitutional right to obtain favorable evidence. See Every Man's Evidence, Wpm note 7, at 1222-30.
That commentator finds support for this new right in the Supreme Court decisions in Rovario and
Brady and in a defendant's sixth amendment rights. Id. A procedure is proposed whereby once a
court determines that the defense witness' testimony meets a certain standard of materiality, it
must provide the defendant with relief. Id. at 1214. By proposing this procedure, that commen-
tator abandons the balancing approach set forth in this note. Id. at 1220-21.
It is submitted that a flexible due process approach is more appropriate to the situation
under discussion. As the foregoing commentator recognizes, the governmental interests involved
in Rovario and Brady were both general and fairly constant. Id. at 1222. For example, in Rovario
the Supreme Court was called upon to balance the defendant's need for the evidence against the
government interest in maintaining the anonymity of its informers, see test at notes 21-27 supra,
and in Brady, the prosecution failed to offer any specific governmental interest to weigh against
the defendant's need for the suppressed evidence. See Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Unlike these
situations, however, the interest of the government in opposing a grant of defense witness im-
munity may vary with the individual case. See text at notes 83-84 supra. Further, the sixth
amendment has never been held to guarantee a defendant the right to the immunized testimony
of his witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199-1200 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913 (1979);
United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237, 1240 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053
(1974). Therefore, this note rejects the application of a rigid constitutional rule in favor of a case-
by-case balancing approach to determine whether due process requires that a court provide a par-
ticular defendant with a judicial remedy.
' 46 See, e.g., Note, Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66 GEO. Li. 51
(1977); Re-examination, supra note 7, at 88-92; Columbia Note, supra note 7, at 973-75.
147 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978). See also Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1239
(court should order the prosecutor either to statutorily immunize defense witness or to drop the
charges against defendant).
146 See text at note 134 supra.
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intention to distort the fact finding process by concealing relevant evidence.H°
Under the Immunity Act of 1970, a court does not have the power to order the
prosecutor to exercise its statutory discretion to grant immunity for defense
witnesses."° Nonetheless, a court is empowered to put the prosecutor to an
election to either grant the immunity or suffer certain consequences at trial
where it determines that he has abused this discretion."' This authority stems
from a court's power to control the trial itself. 152 In this situation, however, it is
the abuse of discretion by the prosecutor in refusing a request for defense
witness immunity which forms the due process violation and, thereby, em-
powers the court to supply a cure. In accordance with the concept of separation
of powers, the courts have traditionally exercised deference to prosecutorial
discretion"' and recognized the tendency of the executive branch to exercise
this discretion in ways that make it more likely that defendants will be con-
victed.'" Therefore, it is only where the prosecutor has abused his discretion
that a remedy which impinges on this discretion becomes appropriate. It
follows then that, absent some misconduct or abuse of discretion by the prose-
cutor in refusing to grant defense witness immunity, a court should refrain
from employing this type of remedy to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.
To do so would raise serious separation of powers questions.
Where a court determines that a prosecutor has not abused his discretion
by refusing a defendant's request that his witnesses be immunized, but never-
theless finds that a defendant's inability to compel the testimony deprives him
of a fair trial, the proper solution is for the court to grant judicial use immunity
to the witnesses.'" Although grants of judicial use immunity have never been
employed to enable a defendant to compel his witnesses to testify in his behalf,
this particular remedy has been applied by the federal courts in other'contexts.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,' 56 the Supreme Court
pioneered the use of this type of remedy. In that case, certain witnesses were
subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission, a
bi-state agency approved by Congress."' After refusing to answer certain ques-
tions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them, the wit-
nesses were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey
and New York.'" They continued to refuse to testify, however, on the ground
"9 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1980).
' 5° See text and note at note 6 supra. See also In re Dale.y, 549 F.2d 469;479 (7th Cir..
1977); Thompson v. Garrison, 516 F.2d 986, 988 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Allstate
Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1974).
"' See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203-04 (3d Cir. 1978).
"2 See Columbia Note, supra note 7, at 973.
'" See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 683 (1973).
"4 See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1203-04 (3d Cir. 1978).
1 " Recently, the Third Circuit has decided that it will apply this remedy to effectuate a
defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See Government of the Virgin Island's v. Smith, 615
F.2d 964, 969-71 (3d Cir. 1980). This Note examines the basis for this remedy and proposes a
procedure for its implementation.
156 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
'" Id. at 53.
"8 Id.
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that their answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law to which
the immunity did not purport to extend.'" The New Jersey Supreme Court af-
firmed a judgment holding them in contempt. 16 °
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the contempt judgment.'" It held
that a state may not compel a witness to give testimony which might be used
against him in a federal prosecution. 162
 The Court concluded, moreover, that
in order to implement this constitutional rule, the testimony elicited under
compulsion by the state immunity grants could not be used in a federal prose-
cution against the witnesses.'" In effect, the Supreme Court granted the wit-
nesses use immunity.
The Supreme Court's decision in Murphy demonstrates that a court has
the power to supply judicial immunity grants, notwithstanding the availability
of statutory immunity grants. The Murphy Court, exercising its supervisory
power over the federal judiciary, judically fashioned grants of use immunity to
protect the witnesses' fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination.
Consequently, this decision supports an argument in favor of recognizing a
court's ability to confer judicial use immunity upon defense witnesses where
necessary to protect a defendant's due process right to a fair trial.'"
Further support for the idea that a court is empowered to grant judicial
use immunity to effectuate a defendant's constitutional rights can be found in
the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. United States. 165 The Court in Sim-
mons reaffirmed the existence of an inherent judicial power to grant use im-
munity. In that case, several defendants were charged with armed robbery.' 66
Prior to trial, one of the defendants moved to suppress the introduction of a
suitcase containing certain incriminating items which he alleged had been il-
legally seized.' 67 In order to establish standing for the motion, the defendant
testified that, although he could not identify the suitcase with certainty, it was
similar to one he owned and that it was his clothing which was found in it. 168
The district court denied the motion to suppress and the defendant's testimony
at the suppression hearing was subsequently admitted against him at trial.' 69
The defendant was convicted and his conviction was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals."°
The Supreme Court vacated his conviction on appeal."' It agreed with
the defendant that his constitutional rights were violated when his testimony in
159 Id. at 53-54.
' 6° Id. at 54.
161 Id. at 80.
162 Id. at 78-79.
163 Id. at 79.
' 64 Su United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980).
165 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
166





"I Id. at 382.
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support of the motion to suppress was admitted against him at trial. 12 The
Court reasoned that a defendant should not have to surrender his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self incrimination in order to assert a valid fourth
amendment claim.'" In conclusion, the Court stated:
We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a mo-
tion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his
testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the
issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.' 74
Therefore, the Court applied a judicial grant of use immunity in Simmons to ef-
fectuate the defendant's fourth amendment guarantee of freedom from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. In addition, this particular remedy has been ap-
plied by lower federal courts to effectuate other constitutional rights of criminal
defendants." 5 Moreover, without statutory authority, federal courts have
granted judicial use immunity in a growing number of situations other than
criminal prosecutions. 176
Consequently, the use of a judicial grant of immunity is only novel in the
sense of its application to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial where that
right has been violated by his inability to compel testimony in his behalf.'" The
fact that an established remedy has never been applied to protect a particular
constitutional right was attributed little significance by the Supreme Court in
its decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Narcotics Agents. 18 There the
Court permitted a plaintiff to bring a private action for damages based upon a
violation of his fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.'" Although the fourth amendment does not explicitly provide for the
remedy of money damages, the Court held that this remedy would be applied
to effectuate the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. 18° The Court noted that
this particular remedial mechanism was generally available in the federal
courts to protect other rights and, in the absence of affirmative action by Con-
gress, saw no reason why it could not be used to protect this particular constitu-
tional right.
Bivens represents a healthy trend on the part of the judiciary to give effect
to the principle that every deprivation of a constitutional right should find vin-
172
 Id. at 390.
'" Id. at 394.
174 Id
'" See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1978) (testimony
given to assert Speech and Debate Clause defense); United States v. Immon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d
Cir. 1977) (testimony given to assert double jeopardy clause defense).
176 See, e.g., Shimabku v. Britton, 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1974) (inmate testifying before
prison disciplinary proceedings); United States v. Deritt, 499 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1974) (public
employee testifying before disciplinary proceedings); Flint v. Mullen, 372 F. Supp. 213 (D.R.I.
1974) (defendant testifying at deferred sentence hearing).
'" See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1980).
176 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
'" Id. at 397.
' 8° Id. at 396-97.
"' Id. at 395-97.
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dication in an effective remedy.' 82 Where an individual may be deprived of a
constitutional right, it is the responsibility of the courts to develop remedies to
protect that right.'" The analysis employed by the Bivens Court is equally ap-
plicable to the issue of whether the federal courts have the power to grant
judicial use immunity to defense witnesses to effectuate a defendant's right to a
fair trial. Although the application of this remedy is novel when applied to pro-
tect the due process guarantee of a fair trial, there is no reason why this right is
entitled to any less affirmative judicial protection than the rights to which this
remedy has already been applied. Indeed, as the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has recognized:
It would seem that a case in which clearly exculpatory testimony
would be excluded because of a witness' assertion of the fifth amend-
ment privilege would present an even more compelling justification
for such a grant of judicial use immunity than that accepted in
Simmons itself.'"
Accordingly, when a court decides that a defendant's inability to compel testi-
mony on his behalf by a grant of immunity deprives him of his due process
right to a fair trial, it should grant judicial use immunity to his witnesses.
B. Implementing the Remedy
The determination in each case of whether to provide this remedy to pro-
tect a defendant's right to a fair trial will involve a court in a difficult balancing
process. The court, upon being confronted with a request for defense witness
immunity, will have to decide whether the defendant's need for the testimony,
otherwise unavailable to him, outweighs the prosecutor's interest in opposing
the immunization of the defense witness. Moreover, because of the unique and
affirmative nature of this remedy and the important governmental interests in-
volved in a grant of defense witness immunity, implementation of judicial use
immunity to protect a defendant's due process right should be bounded by
special safeguards and made subject to certain conditions. 1 "S These considera-
tions, however, do not mean that the due process guarantee of a fair trial
within the immunity context should be protected any less vigilantly than the
same right in other situations. On the contrary, the constitutional right is en-
titled to the same amount of protection in each case.' 86 To this extent, the dif-
ficulty of administering the proposed remedy cannot be used to justify a court's
refusal to apply it where a defendant's right to a fair trial is jeopardized by his
inability to compel testimony from his witnesses.
The Supreme Court's decision in Chambers assists in laying the ground-
work for deciding when a court should exercise its inherent remedial powers to
protect this due process right to a fair trial. There the Court found that a de-
182 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
' 8 ' See Re-examination, supra note 7, at 88.
"* United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978).
182 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 971-72 (3d Cir. 1980).
186 See id. at 972.
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fendant's need for certain testimonial evidence outweighed the government's
interest in the rigid enforcement of its evidentiary rules that prohibited the ad-
mission of such evidence.'" Central to the Court's analysis was the existence of
two factors which the court found particularly relevant. First, the Court noted
the clearly exculpatory nature of the excluded evidence.' 88
 Second, the Court
adverted to the fact that the government had no strong interest in strictly en-
forcing the evidentiary rules that precluded the admission of this evidence.' 89
The logic of Chambers can be readily applied to a case involving a defendant's
request for defense witness immunity. Before a court should grant judicial use
immunity to a defense witness, therefore, it should require that two conditions
first exist: (1) the nature of the witness' testimony must be clearly exculpatory
and otherwise unavailable to the defendant; and (2) there must be an absence
of any strong governmental interests which militate against a grant of defense
witness immunity. Where each of these conditions exist, the court should not
hesitate to grant judicial immunity to a defense witness)"
The judicial determination of the existence of these two conditions, as a
prerequisite to granting immunity to defense witnesses, can be practicably im-
plemented pursuant to the following standard form of procedure.'" At the
outset, when a defendant first learns that a prospective witness intends to in-
voke his privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify, he should im-
mediately request the prosecutor to statutorily immunize his witness. If the
prosecutor accedes to this request, the witness can be immunized pursuant to
the Act of 1970 and his testimony compelled in accordance with the provisions
of that statute. If, however, the prosecutor refuses this request,'" the defend-
ant should then apply for a grant of judicial use immunity for his witness)" In
support of this motion, the defendant should submit to the court a list of ques-
tions he seeks to ask the witness at trial, specify the witness' expected
responses, explain the relationship between the prospective testimony and the
' 87 See text and notes at notes 41-49 supra.
"" See Chambers, 410 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1973).
1S9 See id. at 297.
19° See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980). •
19 ' This proposed procedure to implement the remedy of a judicial grant of use immuni- .
ty to defense witnesses incorporates various suggestions made by previous commentators. See,
e.g. , Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1238-40; Re-examinaiion, supra note 7, at 93-95.
Although a court may adopt its own method for implementing this remedy, this procedure is pro-
posed here because of its manageability.
192
 If the defendant happens to be in the Third Circuit, he may be able to argue, at this
point, that the prosecutor's refusal violates due process. See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d
1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978). To be successful in this argument, however, the defendant will have
to show that the prosecutor's refusal was made with the deliberate intention to distort the judicial
•fact finding process. Id.
193
 This note contemplates that the application for judicial use immunity will usually be
made before the trial. Thus, assuming that the court finds that judicial immunity is warranted,
the defendant will gain access to the testimony in time to carefully prepare his defense. See United
States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412, 417-18 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Permitting this motion in the mid-
dle of the trial may result in a delay of the proceedings. Moreover, a court should be more in-
clined to deny the motion if made during trial because of the additional burden it would place on
the government to marshal the evidence then available concerning the witness, who might be the
subject of a future prosecution, at a time when the prosecutor's resources are tied up in conduct-
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defendant's case-in-chief and give his reasons why he believes that equivalent
evidence is not otherwise available. 194 If the court finds that the proffered testi-
mony is ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or relates only to the
credibility of a witness, it should deny the defendant's motion.' 95 If, however,
the court decides that, on the basis of this information, the defendant has
satisfied the first condition of the Chambers test by demonstrating the requisite
material nature of the excluded testimony, 196 it should schedule an evidentiary
hearing.
The purpose of this evidentiary hearing is two-fold. The court should
utilize this hearing to determine whether the fifth amendment privilege would
actually protect the witness' testimony and, if so, whether that testimony close-
ly approximates the responses expected by the defendant. In order to avoid
later difficulties, this evidentiary hearing should be an in camera proceeding' 97
with only the judge, court reporter and the defense witness present.'" Initially,
the court should examine the witness to determine the exact extent to which the
privilege against self incrimination may excuse the witness from answering the
ing the trial. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980). Further, allow-
ing such a motion to be made during the trial might permit unscrupulous defense counsel to use
this as a tool to harass the prosecutor. See Re-examination, supra note 7, at 95.
A case may arise, however, where it may be necessary for a defendant to request defense
witness immunity during the trial. For example, the defendant may discover a new witness after
the trial has begun who could give exculpatory testimony but who refuses to testify by invoking
the fifth amendment privilege. See id. Or a situation may occur where it may be necessary for a
court to postpone the defendant's motion until the close of the government's case in order to
determine whether the witness' testimony meets the relevant standard of materiality. See United
States ‘r. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 412, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Therefore, the court should avoid a
mechanical rule of timing of the defendant's motion and, instead, consider the factor of timing in
its overall assessment whether to grant judicial use immunity to the witness. See id.
1 " See Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1238-39; Re-examination, supra note 7, at 94.
See also Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) (defendant
should submit application naming the proposed witness and specifying the particulars of his testi-
mony). In order to prevent the prosecutor from discovering the defendant's defense, this material
should be kept confidential by the court. See Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1239 n.125.
14 ' See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980).
146 To determine whether the testimony of the proposed witness is clearly exculpatory
under the proposed test, a court might adopt the materiality standard suggested by a recent com-
mentator. See Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1235. That standard is whether the witness'
testimony "could reasonably affect the outcome of the case." Id. As this commentator notes,
such a high materiality threshhold assures that a request for defense witness immunity will only
succeed where demonstrably necessary thus preventing defendant's use of such requests to
obstruct the proceedings. Id. at 1236.
197 Support for this in camera hearing can be found in the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1976), where the court approved the
lower court's use of this procedure to determine the extent to which a defense witness who in-
voked the fifth amendment privilege would be excused from answering the defendant's proposed
questions. Id. at 1044-47. The in camera nature of the hearing adequately protects the witness'
fifth amendment privilege. Id. See generally Note, The Fifth Amendment Testimonial Privilege as an Im-
pediment to the Defense When Invoked by a Potential Exculpatory Witness, 42 ALB. L. REV. 482 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Albany Note].
"8 A general in camera hearing in the presence of the prosecutor and the defense would
be useless because it would have to be limited to questions which did not require the witness to
reveal incriminatory information. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). More-
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defendant's proposed questions.' 99 At this point, if the court finds that the
witness' claim of the fifth amendment privilege is not well founded, it should
terminate the hearing. 200 The court, in this instance, should deny the defend-
ant's motion for a grant of judicial immunity because such a remedy is unnec-
essary since the court has decided that the witness cannot invoke the privilege if
called to testify. 20 ' On the other hand, if the court decides that the privilege can
be properly invoked by the witness, it should then proceed to examine him to
determine whether his testimony tracks the expected responses by the defend-
ant previously held by the court to satisfy the materiality standard. 202 When the
court finds this to be the case, the defendant has met his threshhold burden of
establishing the existence of the first condition of the Chambers test.
At this point in the procedure, the focus should shift to a consideration of
the prosecutor's countervailing interests, if any, involved in a grant of judicial
immunity to the witness. 2" - Unlike the situation where a prosecutor is ordered
by a court to disclose evidence he has suppressed in violation of the Brady rule,
a judicial grant of immunity to a defense witness impacts not only on the pro-
secutor's ability to successfully prosecute the defendant, but also on his ability
to successfully prosecute the immunized witness at a later date. It is precisely
for this reason that, after having determined that the prospective witness'
testimony would be material to the defense of the accused, the courts should
carefully examine the governmental interest at stake before granting immuni-
ty.'" This circumstance, however, does not necessarily mean that there can be
no reconciliation of the prosecutor's interest and the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Indeed, in many instances, a grant of defense witness immunity may be
virtually costless to the government. For example, the prosecutor may have
already gathered all the evidence necessary to prosecute the witness exclusive
over, the presence of the defendant alone would raise another problem. As one commentator has
noted, if the court decided to deny judicial immunity to the witness, the witness could later argue
that he was forced to reveal incriminatory information before the defendant. This would impose
a burden on the prosecutor to prove that its evidence against the witness in a subsequent prosecu-
tion was not tainted. See Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1239 n.126.
199 See Albany Note, supra note 197, at 488.
2" In this event, the record of the witness' testimony should be prepared and sealed by
the court. See United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1976). This
record would then be available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal of the denial of
defense witness immunity by the defendant. See id, See also Albany Note, supra note 197, at 491;
Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1240.
2°1
 Thus, under the first part of the test proposed here, the witness would not be
"unavailable" to the defendant. See text at note 190 supra.
202
 See Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1239.
2°' See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1980).
204
 This conclusion flows from the flexible due process approach adopted in this note,
which balances the defendant's need for the testimony against the government's interest in op-
posing a grant of defense witness immunity. For a discussion of a contrary approach taken by one
recent commentator, see Every Man's Evidence, supra note 7, at 1213-14. It is submitted here that
only a balancing approach such as the one proposed in this note adequately reconciles the con-
flicting interests of the government and the defendant while still sufficiently protecting the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, where the government does not have a specific and
significant interest in opposing a grant of defense witness immunity, the court will provide a
judicial remedy to protect the defendant's right to due process.
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of the prospective testimony to be given at the defendant's trial."' In this situa-
tion, the prosecutor should be able to certify this evidence under seal before the
witness is immunized and, therefore, should encounter little difficulty estab-
lishing the independent nature of the evidence at a subsequent prosecution of
the witness.'" Moreover, where the prosecutor has not gathered sufficient
evidence against the witness at the time the defendant applies for a grant of
judicial immunity, it may be able to "sterilize" the witness' immunized testi-
mony and, thus, isolate it from any future evidence uncovered by a subsequent
investigation of the witness."' This procedure would allow for a later prosecu-
tion of the witness because the newly discovered evidence could be demon-
strated to have an independent source. Finally, there appears to be little reason
why the prosecutor would not be able to seek a postponement of the
defendant's trial in order that it might complete its investigation of the defense
witness who is the subject of the immunity application."' In short, if the pro-
secutor could avail itself of any of these options then its interest in opposing the
grant of defense witness immunity loses much of its significance and, essential-
ly, reduces itself to a formal concern. 209 As the Supreme Court in Chambers im-
plicitly recognized, a merely formal interest on the part of the government can-
not outweigh a defendant's right to a fair tria1. 210 This reasoning seems equally
applicable in the immunity context. Consequently, where the defendant has
sustained his threshhold burden of showing the material nature of the witness'
testimony, the court should accordingly notify the prosecutor and require him
to demonstrate a compelling reason why the court should not grant the defend-
ant's application.
To successfully oppose a defendant's motion for a grant of judicial im-
munity to a defense witness, the prosecutor will have to prove the absence of
the second condition of the Chambers test. In other words, he will need to
demonstrate strong countervailing reasons why, in each case, the defense wit-
ness should not be immunized by the court. The mere fact that the witness is an
actual or potential target of prosecution should not alone satisfy this burden. 2 "
Instead, the prosecutor should be required to affirmatively demonstrate why
2" Set Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980). See
also Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1274-75.
206 Id.
267 Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980). See also
Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1277; Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution and the
Fifth Amendment: "Criminal Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A Rational Accommodation?", 671
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 164 (1976) (Assistant U.S. Attorney General advocates special
procedures for handling testimony of immunized witnesses such as strictly controlling
transcripts, documenting the people who have access to the isolated testimony, and requesting
limited public disclosure of the testimony given at trial).
200 See Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1278-79.
"9 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1980).
210 See Chambers, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
211 This conclusion follows from the availability of safeguards to facilitate the prosecu-
tion of immunized witnesses. See text at notes 205-08 supra. Contra, United States v. Turkish, 623
F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980) (court should summarily reject claims for defense witness immunity
whenever witness is an actual or potential target of prosecution).
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available procedures to ensure the successful prosecution of the witness at a
later date could not be utilized in the particular case.'" Absent proof of this
nature, the government's action in opposing the defendant's application for
defense witness immunity must be viewed as unreasonable and held to be out-
weighed by the defendant's demonstrated critical need for the witness' testi-
mony. Under these circumstances, the court should grant judicial use immuni-
ty to the defense witness in order to effectuate the defendant's due process right
to a fair trial.
C. Rationale for Adapting the Proposal
In order to understand the rationale for adopting the foregoing proposal,
one needs to examine and analyze the frequent criticisms levied against imple-
menting such a remedy.'" On the whole, five principal reasons are given by
the courts to deny the provision of defense witness immunity to defendants.
Each reason against granting any relief derives from the public interests im-
plicated by a grant of defense witness immunity. The first criticism is that,
although the prosecution remains theoretically free under Kastigar to prosecute
a witness granted use immunity, the obstacles to a successful prosecution can
be substantial.'" While it is readily conceded that certain procedures are avail-
able to reduce these obstacles, it is argued that these safeguards are insufficient
to ensure the successful prosecution of the immunized witness in all cases.'"
Further, it is contended that administering them could result in significant
costs to the government in terms of prosecutorial resources. 216
Although this criticism is not without some validity, it cannot be used as a
basis for a court's refusal to grant judicial immunity across the board. Rather,
the risk that the utilization of these safeguards may not guarantee the subse-
quent conviction of a particular immunized defense witness should be one fac-
tor in the court's determination whether to provide relief to a specific defend-
ant. Where the prosecutor can make a good faith demonstration that it will not
be able to meet its burden under Kastigar, the court would be justified in refus-
ing to grant defense witness immunity in that case. The fact that there may be
some situations where employing these safeguards will not ensure satisfaction
of the prosecutor's burden to show lack of taint, however, does not necessarily
212 This proof may include as a factor the severity of the crime of which the witness is
charged, but only if it is relevant to a demonstration why the safeguards discussed in this note
could not be employed with reasonable success. Under the concept of due process, a defendant's
right to the immunized testimony of his witnesses cannot be made to depend on the circumstance
whether the witness is suspected of a serious as opposed to a non-serious offense.
712
 These criticisms have been summed up in a recent Second Circuit decision. See
United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980).
214
 Id. at 775.
215 Id.
216 Id.
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mean that they will be insufficient in every case. In many instances, the investi-
gation of the prospective defense witness may be sufficiently complete so that
use of these safeguards would permit prosecution of the immunized witness. A
grant of defense witness immunity in this situation results in minimal cost to
the government. Moreover, the argument that additional prosecutorial
resources will have to be expended in implementing these safeguards is not
convincing. Economy in the administration of criminal justice should not be an
important consideration where constitutional rights are at stake. Additionally,
the prosecutor will have to sustain these costs only in the limited instance where
the immunized witness' testimony is crucial to the defendant's defense. Thus,
the requirement that the defendant demonstrate the material nature of the
witness' testimony before the court will grant judicial immunity avoids
needlessly subjecting the prosecutor to shouldering the burden under Kastigar.
Compelling the prosecutor to pay these costs where necessary to protect a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial, therefore, imposes only a small burden on the
government.
The second criticism is that the immunized defense witness might attempt
to give himself an immunity bath by allowing his testimony to range widely
during examination. 2 ' 7 This criticism is entirely unpersuasive. Immunity baths
of this kind would be impossible because only the witness' answers which are
directly responsive to the questions put forth acquire the protection of the im-
munity grant. 218 Thus, a witness would be unable to lessen the likelihood of
any subsequent successful prosecution by giving fulsome answers or the stand.
In any event, as one commentator has noted, "kit would require a view of
criminals as cooly calculating and not averse to substantial risk to envision
them flocking into court to receive use immunity . . . in the hope that the
government might not be able to prove lack of taint in the later
prosecution." 219 Not only would such defense witnesses not obtain the benefits
of transactional immunity, but they would also run the risk of triggering an im-
mediate investigation against them by drawing attention to the criminal nature
of their acts. 22 °
The third criticism similarly stems from an apprehension that defense
witness immunity could create opportunities for undermining the administra-
tion of justice by inviting cooperative perjury among criminals. It is argued
that co-defendants could secure use immunity for each other and each immun-
ized witness could then exonerate his co-defendant at a separate trial by falsely
accepting sole responsibility for the crime, secure in the knowledge that his ad-
mission could not be used at his own trial for the substantive offense. 22 ' Fur:
ther, it is contended that the threat of a perjury conviction, with penalties fre-
2" Id.
218 See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972) (im-
munity may properly be denied to unresponsive answers).
219
 Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1278 n.76.
229 Id.
221 See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980).
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quently far below substantive offenses, by itself, could not be relied upon to
prevent such tactics. 222
Although this criticism seems appealing, the safeguards previously
discussed could be employed to prevent such a result. Typically, the pro-
secutor's case against all co-defendants is fully prepared before they are
brought to trial. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor can seal and certify
all available evidence against the co-defendant-witness prior to a grant of
judicial immunity to him. This procedure would reduce, if not totally
eliminate, the burden of proving lack of taint in the prosecution of the co-de-
fendant. Moreover, the threat of a perjury conviction in addition to the strong
likelihood that the witness may be successfully prosecuted for the substantive
offense should serve to restrain such tactics. Finally, insofar as these tactics
might still be used to abuse a grant of defense witness immunity, this would be
a factor for a court to consider in determining whether to grant relief. The mere
possibility for abuse, however, should not lead the courts to deny judicial im-
munity in every case.
The fourth criticism is based upon the belief that the granting of immunity
is pre-eminently the function of the Executive Branch. 223 Inasmuch as this
belief pertains to a grant of statutory immunity under the Act of 1970, it is a
valid criticism. It is not convincing, however, when applied to a grant of
judicial use immunity. The courts have a constitutional responsibility to ensure
the fairness of a trial. Conferring judicial immunity to a defense witness per-
mits a court to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial without directly acting
in the domain of either the Legislative or the Executive Branch. Indeed, a
grant of judicial immunity avoids adding a gloss to the Act of 1970 or forcing
the prosecutor to exercise his exclusive statutory discretion. Also, the pro-
secutor retains final control over the decision whether a defense witness will be
granted immunity, statutory or judicial, because it can always drop the charges
against the defendant. Consequently, this particular criticism is without validi-
ty.
Finally, the last criticism goes to the fundamental capability of the
judiciary to implement this proposal. It is contended that a court cannot deter-
mine whether to grant judicial immunity without assessing . the implications
upon the Executive Branch, both those that flow from a grant of immunity and
from an adjudication of whether such immunity is appropriate in a particular
case. 224 These considerations, it is argued, are matters normally better assessed
by prosecutors than by judges. 225
This criticism reflects a concern that, once a court determines the material
nature of a defense witness' testimony, it cannot properly evaluate the prosecu-
tor's interest in opposing a grant of judicial immunity to that witness. Yet,
222 Id.
223 Id. at 776.
224 See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1980).
"' Id.
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although this evaluation may ultimately prove to be difficult in practice, this
fact alone does not absolve the courts of their constitutional responsibility to
protect defendants' due process rights. If the courts are willing to accept this
responsibility, as they must, then they should be prepared to undertake this dif-
ficult inquiry into "unchartered waters." 226 This course will ensure that the
determination whether defendants' constitutional rights have been violated will
be made by a neutral party rather than a party whose necessary tendency is to
exercise its discretion to see that convictions are obtained. Furthermore, only if
the courts attempt to make this assessment, can experience be gained which
will assist in the development of meaningful standards for future cases. Viewed
in this light, the foregoing proposal can serve as a vehicle for analyzing and
resolving some of these difficulties.
In conclusion, it is important to realize the underlying rationale for this
proposal. The courts have a definite responsibility to protect a defendant's due
process right to a fair trial. Where a defendant is able to demonstrate that his
inability to compel the testimony of a particular witness will deprive him of
clearly exculpatory evidence crucial to his defense and where the prosecutor
fails to establish a compelling reason why defense witness immunity should not
be granted, a court should exercise its inherent remedial power to provide the
defendant with a judicial safeguard to protect his right to due process. It is the
position of this Note that such a safeguard should consist of a grant of judicial
use immunity to the defense witness.
CONCLUSION
The due process clause of the fifth amendment assures a criminal defend-
ant the right to a fair trial. Up to this point, only a handful of courts have been
willing to consider this right to include, under certain circumstances, the ability
to compel testimony from defense witnesses by a grant of immunity. In many
situations, however, the inability of a defendant to compel testimony on his
behalf may mean the difference between a conviction or an acquittal.
Recent statutory and case law developments have facilitated arguments in
favor of effectuating the due process guarantee of a fair trial by providing a
defendant with defense witness immunity. These developments warrant that it
is time the courts assumed responsibility for protecting a defendant's right to a
fair trial where his inability to compel testimony violates that right.
This can be accomplished by the courts employing a balancing test to
weigh the conflicting interests of the prosecutor and the defendant. Where a
court determines that the defendant's need for the witness' testimony out-
weighs the prosecutor's interest in opposing a grant of defense witness immuni-
226 Id.
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ty, it should no longer hesitate to provide the defendant with the relief he seeks.
This relief should take the form of a grant of judicial use immunity to the
defense witness.
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